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Abstract 
 
Even though passwords are the most convenient 
means of authentication, they bring along themselves 
the threat of dictionary attacks. Dictionary attacks may 
be of two kinds: online and offline. While offline 
dictionary attacks are possible only if the adversary is 
able to collect data for a successful protocol execution 
by eavesdropping on the communication channel and 
can be successfully countered using public key 
cryptography, online dictionary attacks can be 
performed by anyone and there is no satisfactory 
solution to counter them. This paper presents a new 
authentication protocol which is called CompChall 
(computational challenge). The proposed protocol uses 
only one way hash functions as the building blocks and 
attempts to eliminate online dictionary attacks by 
implementing a challenge-response system. This 
challenge-response system is designed in a fashion that 
it does not pose any difficulty to a genuine user but is 
time consuming and computationally intensive for an 
adversary trying to launch a large number of login 
requests per unit time as in the case of an online 
dictionary attack. The protocol is stateless and thus 
less vulnerable to DoS (Denial of Service) attacks.  
 
1. Introduction 
 
Presently, a vast majority of systems use passwords 
as the means of authentication. Passwords are very 
convenient for the users, easier to implement and so 
are very popular also. Although more secure 
authentication schemes have been suggested in the 
past, e.g., using smartcards, none of them have been in 
widespread use in the consumer market. The password 
based authentication, although very convenient, has 
some drawbacks due to the very nature of this system. 
As is obvious, humans have a tendency to choose 
relatively short and simple passwords that they can 
remember. Thus the chosen passwords belong to a 
small domain making them susceptible to exhaustive 
search or dictionary attacks [2, 3]. There are several 
instances of such attacks on various systems 
throughout the world [1]. 
Password based systems mainly suffer from offline 
and online dictionary attacks. In an offline dictionary 
attack the adversary eavesdrops on the communication 
channel to record data for a successful protocol 
execution. The adversary then goes offline and tests 
passwords against the recorded protocol execution data 
without contacting the server at all. In an online 
dictionary attack, the adversary tries the possible 
passwords by attempting to logging in to the server 
online. Offline dictionary attacks, although severe, can 
be prevented by various protocols using public key 
cryptography suggested in the past. The first password 
based authentication protocol secure against offline 
dictionary attacks, called EKE, was designed by 
Bellovin and Merritt [6]. Since then a number of 
excellent protocols addressing this problem have been 
proposed [4]. However, no satisfactory measures to 
curb online dictionary attacks have been suggested so 
far. There are some methods to deal with them but 
some of them have security flaws and the others are 
impractical in terms of usage. Our discussion will be 
mainly centered on online dictionary attacks and 
measures to curb it. The proposed protocol employs 
fast one way hash functions [11] and reduces the 
number of possible password guesses in a given time 
period. This is done by asking the client to compute the 
response for a given challenge. The computation of this 
response is designed to be a time consuming operation. 
Special care is taken to ensure that the client is not able 
to reuse the computation and to make the protocol 
perfectly stateless. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows:  
In Section 2 we discuss the existing protocols, their 
strengths, weaknesses and flaws (if any). Sections 3 
and 4 are dedicated to the proposed protocol where we 
discuss the basic idea behind the design of the protocol 
and then discuss the protocol at length. In Section 5 we 
discuss a few enhancements and modifications for use 
in specific situations. Finally we conclude the paper in 
Section 6. 
 
2. Related Research 
 
Password based systems are vulnerable to online 
dictionary attacks. These attacks are difficult to curb 
and hence pose a major problem in the functioning of 
password based systems. Countermeasures adopted to 
prevent the online dictionary attacks are many a times 
expensive and yet not very effective. Some of the 
measures adopted to prevent this attack (with their 
drawbacks) are as follows: 
 
2.1. Account Locking 
 
After a few fixed number of unsuccessful login 
attempts, the account of the particular user is locked 
for some time. This is certainly helpful in preventing 
the online dictionary attacks by limiting the number of 
wrong password guesses in a given time period. 
However, if adapted, account locking makes the 
system vulnerable to denial of service (DoS) attacks in 
which an adversary may launch login requests with 
random passwords to lock a user’s account. Thus, the 
genuine users are deprived of the service in that period. 
Yahoo!, for example, reports that users, who compete 
in auctions, use these methods to block the account of 
other users who compete in the same auctions. This 
attack may be worrisome to mission critical 
applications, for example to enterprises whose 
employees and customers use the web to login to their 
accounts. In a similar manner, distributed denial of 
service (DDoS) attack may also be launched on a 
system employing the account locking feature. In this, 
the attacker could plant hidden agents around the web 
and all the agents would start operating at a specific 
time. Thus, they would block a large proportion of the 
accounts of the attacked server by trying to login into 
accounts in that server using random passwords. 
Another major drawback of the “account locking 
feature” is that since it causes user accounts to be 
locked, either by mistake (e.g. by users that do not type 
their passwords correctly) or as a result of dictionary 
attacks, the service provider must operate customer 
service centres to handle calls from users whose 
accounts are locked. The cost of running these centres 
is high, and is estimated to cost more than $25 per 
customer call. Imagine that each user locks his account 
once every five years, then the service cost, per user, 
per year, is at least $5. A news article [1] suggested 
that eBay had not implemented account locking 
features due to the costs of operating customer support 
centers. 
An option here for the service provider could be to 
automatically unlock the account after a fixed amount 
of time (e.g. 12 hours). But then, it is easy for anyone 
to keep the account of a customer always locked (e.g. 
by using programs which send login requests with 
random passwords after every 12 hours) and thus 
totally depriving the customer of the service. 
Despite the above serious problem, account locking 
is still a commonly adopted countermeasure against 
online dictionary attacks. Several major web based 
service providers use this approach to counter online 
dictionary attacks. 
 
2.2. Delayed Response 
 
In this scheme, the server provides a delayed 
response to the user request, say for example, not faster 
than one answer per second. This may prevent an 
attacker from checking sufficiently many passwords in 
a reasonable time. 
This scheme is very effective for local machines in 
which the user has to login to the computer using a 
physically attached keyboard. However, it is 
ineffective in a network environment. The attacker can 
try many login attempts in parallel and circumvent the 
timing measure using the fact that user logins are 
typically handled by servers that can handle many 
login sessions in parallel. For example, the attacker can 
send a login attempt every 10 milliseconds, thus 
obtaining a throughput of 100 login attempts per 
second, regardless of how long the server delays the 
answer to the login attempt. This scheme also suffers 
from global password attacks. An attacker may be 
interested in breaking into any account in the system 
rather than targeting a specific account. A system that 
has many user accounts and enables logins over a 
network accessible to the adversary suffers from such 
attacks. 
 
2.3. Use of CAPTCHA 
 
CAPTCHA (Completely Automated Public Turing 
Test to tell Computers and Humans Apart) is a scheme 
[10] which offers a challenge to the user attempting to 
login. These challenges, for example a distorted and 
cluttered image of a word with textured background, 
are easy for humans to respond but rather difficult for 
computers to answer. It is worthwhile noting here that 
an online attacker is essentially a programmed 
computer. 
Until recently, this scheme was an effective 
countermeasure against online dictionary attacks. 
However, due to recent developments in Artificial 
Intelligence and Computer Vision, programs are 
available which can quickly interpret and answer these 
challenges. EZ-Gimpy and Gimpy for example are 
word based CAPTCHA’s that have been broken by 
Mori and Malik at UC Berkeley Computer Vision 
Group [5]. Due to these developments, even 
CAPTCHA is no longer considered to be a secure 
technique to prevent online dictionary attacks. 
From the above discussion, it is clear that a better 
and elegant method for solving this pressing problem is 
required. 
 
3. A Brief Idea of the Protocol 
 
The proposed protocol attempts to eliminate the 
possibility of a large number of password guesses in a 
small time interval by making guessing a time 
consuming and costly process. Further, the proposed 
protocol is stateless and thus less vulnerable to DoS 
attacks [7]. The protocol does not use public key 
cryptography. This means that the protocol is 
vulnerable to offline dictionary attacks [4] if an 
adversary records data for a successful protocol 
execution by eavesdropping on the communication 
channel. In order to resist offline dictionary attacks, the 
server and client may first establish an SSL connection 
and the session key could be used to encrypt different 
messages of the protocol. Major web based service 
providers like Yahoo! and Hotmail already use SSL for 
protecting login data in transit. Hence, this does not 
seem to require any infrastructure changes. In cases 
where performance degradation due to public key 
cryptography is a concern, we provide a variant of our 
protocol which makes it very difficult to launch offline 
dictionary attack. 
The proposed protocol uses only fast one way hash 
functions [11]. The user and the server are required to 
perform a few hash computations for each login 
attempt. The system is deliberately made time 
consuming and computationally intensive for the client 
to ensure that it is not able to make a large number of 
authentication requests per second. However, our 
system is extremely efficient for the server. 
In the following section, we discuss our protocol at 
length. 
 
4. The Protocol Description 
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Figure 1. Illustration of the different passes of the 
protocol 
 
The following notations have been used: 
 
KBob Secret key of the server Bob, known only to 
him and no one else 
P Password of the user 
n Number of unsuccessful login attempts to be 
stored by the server 
r A 20-bit random number 
R A 128-bit random number 
MAC Message Authentication Code to be sent by the 
server to the client 
H(X) Hash value of X using a one way collision 
resistant hash function 
 
This is a four pass protocol with two of the four 
messages being simple message exchange without any 
encryption. The rest two involve hash computation 
once by the user and once by the server. Figure 1 
shows the different passes of the protocol. The server 
presents a challenge to the client with the client login 
attempt being accepted only if it correctly computes 
the response to the given challenge. This computation 
can easily be increased or decreased by the server at 
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will. The proposed protocol is hereby described 
followed by a brief discussion of the different security 
measures taken to prevent the major threats. 
Throughout the discussion, it is assumed that the user 
is Alice (A) and the server is Bob (B).  
 
4.1. Protocol Description 
 
1. A Æ B:   Alice 
This is a simple login request by the user Alice. 
 
2. B Æ A:   H(r, R), R, H(H(r, P), Alice, KBob, n)  
In response to the request sent by the user, the 
server sends a challenge H(r, R), the value of R and the 
message authentication code (MAC) H(H(r, P), Alice, 
KBob, n).  The challenge H(r, R) is the hash of 
concatenation of two random numbers r (20-bit) and R 
(128-bit). The user is required to compute r from the 
given hash value and the value of R. r may be any 
possible 20-bit number. We will discover shortly the 
purposes for which r and R have been used. The third 
part of the message, MAC is again a hash value and 
unintelligible to anyone other than the server. This 
hash can be regenerated only by the server as the secret 
key KBob is known only to the server. Note that the 
client does not use this MAC in anyway. It only has to 
return the supplied MAC to the server in the next step 
so that the server does not have to store it. This MAC 
is used by the server to check the correctness of the 
value of r found by the user and also for the freshness 
of the message when the user replies with the message 
3 as we will see later. 
To find out the value of r, the user has to check the 
hash values of all the possible 20-bit numbers 
appended with the value of R. This process is 
computationally intensive and may require 
considerable time (about 5 sec or even more depending 
on the system used). If instead of two random 
numbers, only one large random number is used then 
this computation time is very large and hence the user 
will be over burdened, which is undesirable. Further, if 
only a small 20-bit random number is used, then the 
attacker might store the hash values of all the possible 
20-bit random numbers and could easily bypass the 
computation involved by simply looking for the correct 
value of r from the corresponding stored hash values. 
The use of two random numbers one of 20 bits and the 
other of 128 bits thus fulfils two purposes. First, it 
gives just the right amount of computation to the user 
so that the online dictionary attacks are effectively 
countered without inconvenience to a legitimate user. 
Secondly, it prevents the possibility of pre-
computation of hash values of all possible 20 bit 
numbers. Thus, the number R effectively acts as a salt 
in the computation of the number r. The user, after 
receiving the second message, does the required 
computation to find the value of r after which it 
proceeds with the third message. 
 
3. A Æ B:   Alice, H(r, P), MAC 
In order to make the protocol stateless, this step has 
been made independent of the previous steps, i.e., the 
client initiates the connection again after doing the 
required computation and starts with the 3rd step of the 
protocol directly. 
The user, after receiving the second message, 
computes the value of r from the given values and then 
sends her identity, hash of the computed r concatenated 
with the password P, and the MAC. In the message, r 
and P have been hashed instead of sending them 
directly in plaintext. This is to make the protocol 
secure against an eavesdropper. 
The server, after receiving this message, finds out 
the hash of the sent H(r, P) appended with the id of 
Alice, the secret key (KBob) and the stored value of n. It 
then compares the obtained hash value with the sent 
MAC. If they match, the login attempt is successful, 
else the login attempt fails and the server increments 
the value of n. The use of the MAC is that it authorizes 
the supplied r to be the response of a challenge 
generated by the server and prevents the replay attack 
in which the attacker may use the same set of values 
again and again. We have used the value of n (number 
of unsuccessful attempts) in the computation of the 
MAC. So, a repeated use of message 2 is not possible 
as n increments on every unsuccessful attempt. 
Here, an important point to observe is that n does 
not increment on a successful attempt. This is an 
interesting feature making the protocol friendly to the 
legitimate users. This means that if the user was 
successful in his last login attempt, she would be 
allowed to bypass the computation involved by reusing 
the last computation. Thus a legitimate user may 
actually be required to perform the computation only 
the first time she tries to login. For every subsequent 
login attempts, the last computation could be reused as 
long as the login attempt does not fail. 
By the use of MAC, the server is also relieved from 
the burden of storing the current value of r and R for 
checking the correctness of the value sent by the client. 
This makes the protocol perfectly stateless. 
 
4. B Æ A:   Success/Fail 
This is a simple reply by the server indicating 
whether the information provided by the user was 
correct or incorrect. If found correct, the login attempt 
is successful otherwise the user has to start all over 
again with the first message. 
Thus, for every login attempt, the user has to 
compute the value of r to answer the server’s 
challenge. This computation requires time which may 
vary from computer to computer. The computation 
time can be adjusted by simply varying the size of 
number r to keep pace with the computational capacity 
as it increases with time. This computation time is to 
discourage the online dictionary attack in which a 
machine launches thousands of login requests in 
seconds. By using this technique, the number of 
authentication requests possible in a given period of 
time reduces significantly thereby making the process 
of launching attacks costly and time consuming. 
 
4.2. A Brief Security Analysis 
 
In order to better understand the protocol, we 
discuss the various ways in which an adversary may try 
to defeat the scheme. 
In the proposed scheme, the server is not required to 
store either r or R. It verifies the values supplied by the 
user in message 3 only using the supplied MAC. Thus, 
an attacker might try to use the same MAC and hence 
reuse the computation for different login attempts. 
However, such an attempt is countered by our protocol. 
The server uses the stored n to compute the MAC. 
Since the value of stored n would be more than the 
value of n in the sent MAC, the two MACs would not 
match. Hence, the attempt to reuse the computation 
fails. An attacker under no circumstances will be able 
to change the MAC for different set of values of H(r, 
P) and n since the secret key used in the MAC is not 
known to any entity except the server. 
In a similar way, an attempt to use the same value 
of message 3 (computed for a particular user id) for a 
different user id will fail since the user id is also used 
in the MAC computation. Clearly, the only way in 
which a computation may be reused is to reuse it for 
the same user id and value of n. This means that the 
computation can be reused in case the last login 
attempt was successful.  
 
5. Enhancements and Modifications 
 
The protocol presented in Section 4 does not take 
care of the situation in which the server itself may be 
compromised. This is because the server is required to 
store the user password in plaintext since it used for the 
computation of H(r, P) in the computation of MAC. 
The protocol can be augmented so that the server only 
stores a one way hash H(P) of the password and the 
authenticating user is required to have knowledge of 
the actual password itself. Straightforward techniques 
to do this are possible if it is acceptable for the client to 
send the password in plaintext. However, this would 
facilitate replay attacks if the protocol execution is not 
protected by SLL. 
Our augmentation is relatively complex but does 
not make it mandatory to use SSL protection. It 
employs the concept of lamport hashes [8]. To begin 
with, the server stores Hm(P) (which is the mth hash of 
P) and the user is required to supply H(m-1)(P) as a 
password. Once the user has successfully logged in, the 
stored Hm(P) is replaced by the supplied H(m-1)(P). 
Thus, next time the user would be required to supply 
H(m-2)(P). This process continues for m successful login 
attempts. Although, it may seem that the user is 
required to re-initialize the system by choosing a 
different password after m successful logins, there are 
efficient recently designed techniques [9] which allow 
infinite number of login in the lamport system. 
Messages for the ith execution of the protocol are given 
below - 
 
A Æ B:   Alice 
B Æ A:   H(r, R), R, MAC  
A Æ B:   Alice, r, H(i-1)(P), MAC 
B Æ A:   Success/Fail 
MAC = H(r, Hi(P), Alice, KBob, n) 
 
Thus we have augmented the protocol in such a way 
that neither the server is required to store plaintext 
password, nor the password is transmitted in plaintext. 
As discussed earlier, it may be desirable to resist 
offline dictionary attacks without using SSL or other 
public key cryptographic techniques due to efficiency 
concern. Although this is not possible theoretically [4], 
we design a variant which makes it very difficult to 
launch successful offline dictionary attacks. A minor 
variation in the messages produces interesting results. 
In message 2, if H(r, R) is changed to H(r, P, R) (with 
other things unchanged), then the protocol is effective 
in preventing offline dictionary attacks. The protocol 
execution is as follows - 
 
A Æ B:   Alice 
B Æ A:   H(r, P, R), R, MAC  
A Æ B:   Alice, H(r, P), MAC 
B Æ A:   Success/Fail 
MAC = H(H(r, P), Alice, KBob, n) 
 
Now, let’s try to analyze the system assuming that 
the SSL session key has not been used to protect the 
different passes of our protocol. The only thing 
unknown to the user is r. So the required computation 
is similar to as in original protocol. Taking the typical 
amount of time required for a hash computation to be t 
= 0.005 ms on today’s machines, the maximum time 
required by the user to compute r will be 220*t i.e. 
220*0.005*0.001 (= 5.24288 seconds) which is 5 
seconds approximately. 
Let n be the average number of guesses in an offline 
dictionary attack before the actual password is found 
out. Now, since the attacker does not know the value of 
P as well as r, he will require 220*n hash computations 
to find the correct values of r and P from message 2 
(i.e. he will have to try all possible combinations of 
passwords and 20-bit digits). Taking the estimated 
value of n to be 10 million [12], the time required will 
be: 
220*10,000,000*0.005*0.001 seconds = 52428800 
seconds = 1.6625 years. 
It is worth noting that in the original protocol 
proposed in Section 4, the corresponding time to 
launch successful offline dictionary attack is (220*t + 
n*t). Evaluating this expression, we get the time to be 
(5.24288 + 50) = 55.24288 seconds. 
Thus, it is clear that this variant is quite effective in 
the prevention of offline dictionary attacks. This 
variant may be used when the protocol execution is not 
protected by SSL due to performance concerns. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we addressed the problem of online 
dictionary attacks and presented an authentication 
protocol to counter the same. In the protocol, the client 
is required to compute the response to the presented 
challenge. Computing this response is deliberately 
designed to be a time taking operation thus ensuring 
that the client is not able to launch a large number of 
login requests in a small amount of time. The protocol 
is designed in a fashion such that the computation of 
this response does not poses any problems for a 
legitimate user since she may reuse the last 
computation, but is time consuming and costly for an 
adversary trying to launch thousands of login requests 
per second. Finally, we constructed two variants of our 
protocol. The first one deals with augmenting the 
protocol so that the server is not required to store the 
password in plaintext. The second one is concerned 
with removing offline dictionary attacks in case the 
public key cryptography protection is not used. 
Future work involves modifying the protocol such 
that the size of r and hence the required computation 
increases dynamically as the server encounters a large 
number of unsuccessful attempts in a small amount of 
time. Finally, the presented technique could be used to 
address the problem of eliminating more general denial 
of service attacks on web servers by limiting the 
number of requests per second in a similar fashion 
without losing statelessness. 
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